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Abstract
If an agent does not possess the knowledge
needed to perform an action, it may privately
plan to obtain the required information on its
own, or it may involve another agent in the
planning process by engaging it in a dialogue.
In this paper, we show how the requirements
of knowledge preconditions can be used to ac-
count for information-seeking subdialogues in
discourse. We first present an axiomatiza-
tion of knowledge preconditions for the Shared-
Plan model of collaborative activity [Grosz and
Kraus, 1993], and then provide an analysis of
information-seeking subdialogues within a gen-
eral framework for discourse processing. In
this framework, SharedPlans and relationships
among them are used to model the intentional
component of Grosz and Sidner’s [1986] theory
of discourse structure.
1 Introduction
For an agent1 to be able to perform an action, it must
satisfy both the physical and knowledge preconditions
of that action [Moore, 1985; Morgenstern, 1987]. For
example, for an agent to pick up a particular tower of
blocks, it must (1) know how to pick up towers in gen-
eral, (2) be able to identify the tower in question, and
(3) have satisfied the (physical) preconditions or con-
straints associated with picking up towers (e.g., it must
have a free hand). These conditions must hold whether
the agent is planning an action on its own or is involved
in a collaborative planning effort with other agents.
In this paper, we provide an axiomatization of knowl-
edge preconditions for the SharedPlan model of collab-
∗This work was done as part of my dissertation research
at Harvard University, and was supported by a Bellcore grad-
uate fellowship and by U S WEST Advanced Technologies.
I would like to thank Barbara Grosz, Stuart Shieber, and
Candy Sidner for their helpful comments, discussions, and
insights on this work.
1Unless otherwise indicated, we will use the term “agent”
to refer to both individual agents and sets of agents.
orative activity [Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Lochbaum et
al., 1990; Grosz and Kraus, 1993]. This model draws
upon past work [Moore, 1985; Morgenstern, 1987], but
adapts it to the collaborative situation. We briefly de-
scribe the SharedPlan framework in Section 2, and then,
in Section 3, present our axiomatization of knowledge
preconditions. In Section 4, we demonstrate the use of
knowledge preconditions in accounting for information-
seeking subdialogues, such as those in Figure 1. We
then compare our approach to the alternative accounts
[Litman and Allen, 1987; Lambert and Carberry, 1991;
Ramshaw, 1991].
(1) E: First you have to remove the flywheel.
(2) A: How do I remove the flywheel?
(3) E: First, loosen the two allen head setscrews
                holding it to the shaft, then pull it off.
(4) A: OK.
(5)      I can only find one screw.  Where’s the other one?
(6) E: On the hub of the flywheel.
Figure 1: Information-Seeking Subdialogues [Grosz, 1974]
2 SharedPlans
The SharedPlan formalism is a mental-state model of
collaborative plans with roots in Pollack’s [1990] work on
single-agent plans. For a group of agents GR to have a
full SharedPlan (FSP) for an act α, they must satisfy the
requirements given in Figure 2. When the agents have
satisfied only a subset of these requirements, they are
said to have a partial SharedPlan (PSP).2 The bracketed
terms in Figure 2 indicate the operators used by Grosz
and Kraus [1993] to formalize each requirement.
Requirement (1) in Figure 2 refers to the agents’ recipe
[Pollack, 1990] for α. Recipes are modeled in Grosz and
2This description of a PSP is only a rough, though useful,
approximation to the formal definition given by Grosz and
Kraus [1993].
For a group of agents GR to have an FSP for α
1. GR must have mutual belief of a recipe for α
2. For each single-agent constituent act of the recipe, there
must be an agent Gβi ∈ GR, such that
(a) Gβi intends to perform βi [Int.To]
(b) Gβi believes that it can perform βi [BCBA]
(c) Gβi has a full individual plan for βi [FIP]
(d) The group GR has mutual belief of (2a)-(2c)
(e) Each member of GR intends that Gβi succeed
[Int.Th]
3. For each multi-agent constituent act of the recipe, there
must be a subgroup of agents GRβi ⊆ GR such that
(a) GRβi mutually believe that they can perform βi
[MBCBAG]
(b) GRβi has a full SharedPlan for βi [FSP]
(c) The group GR has mutual belief of (3a)-(3b)
(d) Each member of GR intends that GRβi succeed
[Int.Th]
Figure 2: FSP Requirements
Kraus’s definitions as sets of constituent acts and con-
straints. To perform an act α, an agent must perform
each constituent act in α’s recipe according to the con-
straints of that recipe. Actions themselves may be fur-
ther decomposed into act-types and parameters. We will
represent an action α as a term of the form α¯(p1, . . . , pn)
where α¯ represents the act-type of the action and the pi
its parameters.
3 Knowledge Preconditions
Grosz and Kraus [1993] use the operators BCBA (read
“believes can bring about”) and MBCBAG (read “mutu-
ally believe can bring about group”) to formalize respec-
tively requirements (2b) and (3a) in Figure 2. Although
these operators are intended to specify the conditions
under which an agent is able to perform an action, their
definitions explicitly require only that an agent satisfy
the physical preconditions or constraints associated with
an action to be able to perform it. Because an agent is
not truly capable of performing an act unless it possesses
the appropriate knowledge, the definitions of BCBA and
MBCBAG must be augmented with an axiomatization
of knowledge preconditions. The following observations
made by Morgenstern [1987], but recast in our terminol-
ogy, must be represented in such an axiomatization:
1. Agents need to know recipes for the acts they per-
form.
2. All agents have some primitive acts in their reper-
toire.
3. Agents must be able to identify the parameters of
the acts they perform.
4. Agents may know only some descriptions of an act.
5. Agents know that the knowledge necessary for com-
plex acts derives from that necessary for their com-
ponent acts.
Our axiomatization of knowledge preconditions is
based on Morgenstern’s observations, but adapted to
the requirements of individual and shared mental-state
plans.3 We use the predicates has.recipe and id.params
to represent explicitly observations (1) and (3) above.
The remaining observations are implicitly represented by
the way in which these two knowledge precondition rela-
tions are defined. Observation (2) is modeled as the base
case of has.recipe, and observation (5) is modeled by the
use of has.recipe within the recursive plan definitions.
Observation (4) requires that the knowledge precon-
dition relations be intensional, rather than extensional;
within their scope it should not be possible to freely
substitute one representation of an action for another.
We thus define has.recipe and id.params to hold of ac-
tion descriptions, rather than actions. Action descrip-
tions are intensional objects; one action description can
be substituted for another only if the descriptions are
the same. For example, although 555-1234 and phone-
number(speech-lab) may be extensionally equivalent,
the descriptions 555-1234 and phone-number(speech-
lab) are not. By convention, we will omit the corner
quote notation in what follows and simply take the ap-
propriate arguments of the predicates to represent action
descriptions rather than actions.
Although Morgenstern’s observations are most nat-
urally expressed informally in terms of knowledge, we
formalize them using belief to allow for the possibility
of an agent’s being incorrect. Although it is true that
an agent cannot successfully act unless its beliefs about
recipes and parameters are correct, having to know the
recipes and parameters is too strong a requirement for
collaborating agents [Lochbaum, 1994].
3.1 Determining Recipes: has.recipe
For an agent to be able to perform an act α, it must
know how to perform α; i.e., it must have a recipe for
the act. The relation has.recipe(G,α,R, T ) is used to
represent that agent G has a recipe R for an act α at
time T . It is formalized as follows:
has.recipe(G,α, R,T )⇔
(1) [basic.level(α) ∧
BEL(G, basic.level(α), T ) ∧R = REmpty ] ∨
(2) [¬basic.level(α) ∧
(2a) R = {βi, ρj} ∧
(2a1) {[|G| = 1 ∧ BEL(G,R ∈ Recipes(α), T )] ∨
(2a2) [|G| > 1 ∧MB(G,R ∈ Recipes(α), T )]}]
Clause (1) of the definition models Morgenstern’s sec-
ond observation, namely that agents do not need a recipe
to perform a basic-level action, i.e., one executable at will
3A comparison of our formalization with those of Mor-
genstern [1987] and Moore [1985] can be found elsewhere
[Lochbaum, 1994].
[Pollack, 1990].4 For non-basic-level actions (Clause (2)),
the agent of α (either a single agent (2a1) or a group of
agents (2a2)) must believe that some set of acts, βi, and
constraints, ρj , constitute a recipe for α.
3.2 Identifying Parameters: id.params
An agent must also be able to identify the parameters
of an act α to be able to perform it. For example, if an
agent is told “remove the flywheel,” as in the dialogue of
Figure 1, the agent must be able to identify the flywheel
in question. The relation id.params(G,α, T ) is used to
represent that agent G can identify the parameters of
act α at time T . If α is of the form α¯(p1, ..., pn), then
id.params(G,α, T ) is true if G can identify each of the
pi. To do so, G must have a description of each pi that
is suitable for α¯. The relation id.params is defined as
follows:
id.params(G, α¯(p1, . . . , pn), T )⇔
(∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n) has.sat.descr(G,pi,F(α¯, pi), T )
The ability to identify an object is highly context de-
pendent. For example, as Appelt points out [1985, pg.
200], “the description that one must know to carry out
a plan requiring the identification of ‘John’s residence’
may be quite different depending on whether one is go-
ing to visit him, or mail him a letter.” The function F
in the above definition is an oracle function intended to
model the context-dependent nature of parameter iden-
tification. This function returns a suitable identification
constraint [Appelt and Kronfeld, 1987] for a parame-
ter pi in the context of an act-type α¯. For example, in
the case of sending a letter to John’s residence, the con-
straint produced by the oracle function would be that
John’s residence be described by a postal address.
The relation has.sat.descr(G,P,C, T ) holds of an
agent G, a parameter description P , an identification
constraint C, and a time T , if G has a suitable descrip-
tion, as determined by C, of the object described as P
at time T . To formalize this relation, we utilize Kron-
feld’s [1986] notion of an individuating set. An agent’s
individuating set for an object is a maximal set of terms
such that each term is believed by the agent to denote
that object. For example, an agent’s individuating set
for John’s residence might include its postal address as
well as an identifying physical description such as “the
only yellow house on Cherry Street.” To model indi-
viduating sets, we introduce a function IS(G,P, T ); the
function returns an agent G’s individuating set at time
T for the object that G believes can be described as P .
This function is based on similar elements of the formal
language that Appelt and Kronfeld [1987] introduce as
part of their theory of referring. The function returns a
set that contains P as well as the other descriptions that
G has for the object that it believes P denotes.
For an agent to suitably identify a parameter described
as P , the agent must have a description, P ′, of the pa-
rameter such that P ′ is of the appropriate sort. For
4Basic-level actions are by their nature single-agent
actions.
example, for an agent to visit John’s residence, it is not
sufficient for the agent to believe that the description
“John’s residence” refers to the place where John lives.
Rather, the agent needs another description of John’s
residence, one such as “the only yellow house on Cherry
Street,” that is appropriate for the purpose of visiting
him. To model an agent’s ability to identify a parameter
(described as P ) for some purpose, we thus require that
the agent have an individuating set for the parameter
that contains a description P ′ such that P ′ satisfies the
identification constraint that derives from the purpose.
The definition of has.sat.descr is thus as follows:5
has.sat.descr(G,P, C, T )⇔
{[|G| = 1 ∧
(∃P ′)BEL(G, [P ′ ∈ IS(G,P, T ) ∧
suff.for .id(C,P ′)], T )] ∨
[|G| > 1 ∧
(∃P ′)MB(G, (∀Gj ∈ G)[P
′ ∈ IS(Gj , P, T ) ∧
suff.for .id(C,P ′)], T )]}
The predicate suff.for .id(C,P ′) is true if the constraint
C applies to the parameter description P ′. The oracle
function F(α¯, pi) in id.params produces the appropriate
identification constraint on pi given α¯.
4 The Role of Knowledge Preconditions
in Language Processing
We now show how the requirements of knowledge precon-
ditions can be used in discourse processing. Our model of
discourse processing is based on the theory of discourse
structure proposed by Grosz and Sidner [1986]. Accord-
ing to their theory, discourse structure consists of three
interrelated components: a linguistic structure, an atten-
tional state, and an intentional structure. The linguistic
structure consists of discourse segments6 and an embed-
ding relationship among them; the bold rule in Figure 1
indicates the linguistic structure of that discourse. At-
tentional state is an abstraction of the discourse partic-
ipants’ focus of attention; it serves as a record of those
entities that are salient at any point in the discourse.
Intentional structure is comprised of discourse segment
purposes and their interrelationships, particularly that
of dominance. A discourse segment purpose, or DSP, is
a Gricean-like [1969] intention that leads to the initia-
tion of a discourse segment. One DSP is dominated by
another if the satisfaction of the first provides part of
the satisfaction of the second.
Intentional structure plays a central role in discourse
processing; an agent’s comprehension of the utterances
in a discourse relies on the recognition of this struc-
ture [Grosz and Sidner, 1986]. Grosz and Sidner [1990]
5A more precise account of what it means to be able to
identify an object is beyond the scope of this paper; for fur-
ther details, see the discussions by Hobbs [1985], Appelt and
Kronfeld [1985; 1986; 1987], and Morgenstern [1988].
6The term discourse segment is a generalization of the
term subdialogue. Whereas the term discourse segment ap-
plies to all types of discourse, the term subdialogue is reserved
for segments that occur within dialogues.
proposed SharedPlans to provide a basis for recogniz-
ing intentional structure. They argued that discourses
are fundamentally collaborative, and hence that a model
of shared plans provides a more appropriate basis for
discourse processing than a model of single-agent plans.
However, the connection between SharedPlans and in-
tentional structure was never specified.
4.1 SharedPlans as Intentional Structure
We have developed a model of discourse processing that
provides that connection [Lochbaum, 1994]. Figure 3 il-
lustrates the role of SharedPlans in modeling intentional
structure. Each segment of a discourse has an associ-
ated SharedPlan. The purpose of the segment is taken
to be intention that (Int.Th [Grosz and Kraus, 1993]) the
discourse participants form that plan. This intention is
held by the agent who initiates the segment. In what
follows, we will refer to that participant as the initiating
conversational participant or ICP; the other participant
is the OCP [Grosz and Sidner, 1986]. Dominance rela-
tionships between DSPs are modeled using subsidiary re-
lationships between SharedPlans. One plan is subsidiary
to another if the completion of the first plan contributes
to the completion of the second. Subsidiary relationships
are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2
The utterances of a discourse are understood in terms
of their contribution to the SharedPlans associated with
the segments of the discourse. Those segments that have
been completed at the time of processing an utterance
have a full SharedPlan (FSP) associated with them (e.g.,
segment (2) in Figure 3), while those that have not have
a partial SharedPlan (PSP) (e.g., segments (1) and (3)
in Figure 3).
(2)
(1)
(3)
ui
FSP({G1,G2},    )β
1
PSP({G1,G2},    )β
2
PSP({G1,G2},   )α
Int.Th(ICP ,FSP({G1,G2},   ))αInt.Th(ICP  ,FSP({G1,G2},    ))β1 is dominated by
Int.Th(ICP ,FSP({G1,G2},   ))αInt.Th(ICP  ,FSP({G1,G2},    ))β2 is dominated by
FSP({G1,G2},    )αFSP({G1,G2},    )β1 is subsidiary to
FSP({G1,G2},    )αFSP({G1,G2},    )β2 is subsidiary to
DSPDSP
DSP
2
3
1
DSP1
1
2
3
1
Figure 3: Modeling Intentional Structure
For each utterance of a discourse, an agent must deter-
mine whether the utterance begins a new segment of the
discourse, contributes to the current segment, or com-
pletes it [Grosz and Sidner, 1986]. For an utterance to
begin a new segment, it must indicate the initiation of
a subsidiary plan. This case is described in further de-
tail below. For an utterance to contribute to the current
segment, it must advance the partial SharedPlan associ-
ated with the segment towards completion. That is, it
must establish one of the beliefs or intentions required for
the discourse participants to have a full SharedPlan, but
missing from their current partial SharedPlan. For an
utterance to complete the current segment, it must indi-
cate that the purpose of that segment has been satisfied.
For that to be the case, the SharedPlan associated with
the segment must be an FSP rather than a PSP. That
is, all of the beliefs and intentions required of an FSP, as
indicated in Figure 2, must have been established over
the course of the segment.
A detailed description of the implemented algorithms
used in modeling each of these cases can be found else-
where [Lochbaum, 1994]. Here, we focus on the use of
knowledge preconditions in accounting for the initiation
of information-seeking subdialogues. We use the dia-
logue in Figure 1 as an example and assume the role of
the Expert (participant “E”) in analyzing the discourse.7
The dialogue in Figure 1 was extracted from a larger dis-
course in which the Expert and Apprentice (participant
“A”) are collaborating on removing the pump of an air
compressor. We thus take the purpose of the larger dis-
course to be
DSP1=Int.Th(e, FSP ({a, e}, remove(pump(ac1),{a})))
8
where ac1 represents the air compressor the agents
are working on.
4.2 Accounting for the Initiation of New
Discourse Segments
To make sense of an utterance, an agent must provide
an explanation for it in the form of an answer to the
question, “Why did the speaker say that to me?” [Sid-
ner and Israel, 1981]. An OCP must provide a similar
explanation for an ICP’s initiation of a new discourse
segment. This explanation takes the form of an answer
to the question “Why does the ICP want to engage in
a segment with purpose DSPj at this point in our dis-
course?”; i.e., “How is DSPj related to what we were
talking about before?” Subsidiary relationships between
SharedPlans provide the basis for modeling the OCP’s
reasoning.
One plan is subsidiary to another if the completion of
the first plan contributes to the completion of the sec-
ond. The most basic example of this relationship occurs
within the FSP definition itself. As indicated in Fig-
ure 2, a full plan for an act α includes full plans for each
subact in α’s recipe as components (requirements (2c)
and (3b)). The plans for the subacts thus contribute to
the plan for α and are therefore subsidiary to it.
Subsidiary relationships may also arise in response to
the other requirements of the FSP definition. For exam-
ple, as discussed in Section 3, the BCBA operator used
7For simplicity of exposition, we will take participant “E”
to be female and participant “A” to be male.
8We have omitted the time parameters for simplicity of
exposition.
to model requirement (2b) specifies that to be able to
perform an act α, an agent must (1) have a recipe for
α (has.recipe), (2) be able to identify the parameters of
α (has.sat.descr), and (3) have satisfied the constraints
associated with performing α. The first of these require-
ments provides an explanation for the first subdialogue
in Figure 1.
The purpose of this subdialogue is represented as9
DSP2=Int.Th(a,FSP ({a, e},
Achieve(has.recipe(a,
remove(flywheel(ac1), {a}), R))))
and can be glossed as “the Apprentice intends that the
agents collaborate on his obtaining a recipe for the act
of removing the flywheel of the air compressor.” To ac-
count for the Apprentice’s initiation of this subdialogue,
the Expert must determine the relationship of DSP2 to
the purpose of the agents’ preceding discourse, namely
DSP1. In this case, the Expert can reason that the Ap-
prentice wants to engage in the subdialogue to obtain
a recipe for the act of removing the flywheel so that he
will be able to perform that act as part of the agents’
SharedPlan to remove the pump. The plan in DSP2 is
thus subsidiary to that in DSP1 by virtue of a knowledge
precondition requirement of the latter plan.
Figure 3 illustrates this analysis. Each box in the fig-
ure corresponds to a discourse segment and contains the
SharedPlan used to model the segment’s purpose. The
SharedPlans are labeled so as to be co-indexed with the
DSPs discussed above. The arrows indicate subsidiary
relationships between SharedPlans, as explained by the
text that adjoins them. When plan Pj is subsidiary to
plan Pi, DSPj is dominated by DSPi.
The information represented within each SharedPlan
in Figure 3 is separated into two parts. Those beliefs
and intentions that have been established at the time
of the analysis are shown above the dotted line, while
those that remain to be established, but that are used
in determining subsidiary relationships, are shown below
the line. The index in square brackets to the right of each
constituent indicates the FSP requirement from which
the constituent arose.
As indicated in Figure 4, the initiation of the second
subdialogue in Figure 1 is explained similarly. This time,
however, it is the need to identify parameters of acts
(requirement (2) above) that leads to the initiation of
the subdialogue. In addition, the parameter in question
is a parameter of an act in a subsidiary individual plan
of the Apprentice’s.
4.3 Discussion
In this paper, we have shown that information-seeking
subdialogues may be explained on the basis of knowledge
precondition requirements. Our account of such sub-
dialogues fits within a general framework for discourse
9We describe a method for recognizing DSPs of this form
elsewhere [Lochbaum, 1994].
processing in which the purpose of a subdialogue is mod-
eled using a SharedPlan and is related to the purposes
of other subdialogues based on the requirements of the
FSP definition. Elsewhere [Lochbaum, 1994], we show
that correction and subtask subdialogues, among oth-
ers, may also be accounted for in this manner.
In contrast, alternative plan-based accounts of dia-
logue understanding introduce multiple types of plans
to account for the utterances in a discourse. For ex-
ample, Litman and Allen [1987], propose the use of two
types of plans to model clarification and correction sub-
dialogues: discourse plans and domain plans. Domain
plans represent knowledge about a task, while discourse
plans represent conversational relationships between ut-
terances and plans. Litman and Allen provide operators
for the following discourse plans:
• INTRODUCE-PLAN: introduce a new plan for dis-
cussion
• CONTINUE-PLAN: execute the next action in a
plan
• TRACK-PLAN: talk about the execution of an ac-
tion
• MODIFY-PLAN: introduce a new plan by modify-
ing a previous one
• CORRECT-PLAN: correct a plan
• IDENTIFY-PARAMETER: identify a parameter of
an action in a plan
Under our approach, the recognition of discourse plans
is unnecessary. The fact that a speaker is using an utter-
ance to, for example, introduce a plan, or track a plan,
or identify a parameter, need not be explicitly recog-
nized for the purposes of utterance interpretation. Fur-
thermore, we would argue that such facts are not in-
tended to be recognized (cf. Grice [1969]). Rather, they
simply fall out of recognizing the relationship of an ut-
terance to the current discourse structure, i.e., the cur-
rently active SharedPlans. For example, INTRODUCE-
PLAN corresponds to initiating a new discourse seg-
ment, CONTINUE- or TRACK-PLAN to contributing
to the current segment, and IDENTIFY-PARAMETER
to initiating a new segment to satisfy a has.sat.descr
knowledge precondition requirement. Although the ini-
tiation of a new SharedPlan corresponds to the initiation
of a new discourse segment under our approach, it is the
SharedPlan that must be recognized and not a discourse
plan that refers to that SharedPlan.
Lambert and Carberry [1991] have extended Litman
and Allen’s approach by introducing a third type of
plan. Problem-solving plans, such as BUILD-PLAN
and INSTANTIATE-VARS, are used to model the pro-
cess by which agents construct domain plans. Under
our approach, the need to explicitly recognize problem-
solving plans is also avoided. The fact that an agent is
PSP({a,e},remove(pump(ac1),{a}))
PSP({a,e},Achieve(has.recipe(a,remove(flywheel(ac1),{a}),R)))
BCBA(a,remove(flywheel(ac1),{a}),R)
{remove(flywheel(ac1),{a})} in Recipe(remove(pump(ac1),{a}))
A engages E in P2 because 
he needs to satisfy (a)
(a)
E explains P2 in terms of the role it plays in completing P1, 
namely bringing about the condition marked (a)
Utterances (3)-(4) are understood and produced in this context
P1
P2
[1]
[2b]
Figure 3: Analysis of the First Subdialogue in Figure 1
PSP({a,e},remove(pump(ac1),{a}))
PIP(a,remove(flywheel(ac1),{a}),recipe1)
BCBA(a,remove(flywheel(ac1),{a}),recipe1)
{remove(flywheel(ac1),{a})} in Recipe(remove(pump(ac1),{a}))
P1
P3
FIP(a,remove(flywheel(ac1),{a}),recipe1)
{loosen(screw1,screw2,{a}),
 pull_off(flywheel(ac1),shaft(pump(ac1)),{a})} in recipe1
BCBA(a,loosen(screw1,screw2,{a}),R)
PSP({a,e},Achieve(has.sat.descr(a, Screw,F(loosen,Screw))))P4
Utterance (6) is produced in this context
A engages E in P4 because
he needs to satisfy (b)
(b)
E explains P4 in terms of the role it plays in completing P3, 
namely bringing about the condition marked (b)
E explains P3 in terms of the role it plays in completing P1, 
namely bringing about the condition marked (a)
(a)
[1]
[2b]
[2c]
[1]
[2b]
Figure 4: Analysis of the Second Subdialogue in Figure 1
building a plan or instantiating a variable is a byprod-
uct of understanding an utterance by relating it to
the current discourse structure. BUILD-PLAN corre-
sponds to initiating a new discourse segment to satisfy
a has.recipe knowledge precondition requirement, while
INSTANTIATE-VARS corresponds to initiating one to
satisfy a has.sat.descr requirement. Unlike Lambert and
Carberry’s approach, however, and Litman and Allen’s
as well, our approach actually recognizes this struc-
ture. The other approaches are essentially utterance-
to-utterance based and thus do not recognize discourse
segments as separate units.
Ramshaw [1991] has added a different third type
of plan, exploration plans, to Litman and Allen’s two
types. Exploration plans are intended to model the pro-
cess by which agents explore courses of actions. Al-
though we have not yet incorporated such reasoning
into our model, we hypothesize that the exploration
of plans can be modeled, without the introduction of
a new plan type, by reasoning about an agent’s po-
tential intentions and the process by which they be-
come full-fledged intentions [Grosz and Kraus, 1993;
Bratman et al., 1988].
These alternative approaches share an important
property that distinguishes them from our approach;
they take a data-structure view of plans, rather than
a mental phenomenon view [Pollack, 1990]. Whereas
data-structure plans are essentially “recipes-for-action,”
mental phenomenon plans are a “structured collection of
beliefs and intentions” [Pollack, 1990, pg. 77].10 Data-
structure plans thus describe what an agent is doing with
an utterance, but not why the agent is doing it. For ex-
ample, although the constraints of Litman and Allen’s
10Although Lambert and Carberry [1991] adopt Pol-
lack’s [1990] terminology in presenting their theory, their
“plans” are not mental state plans in Pollack’s sense.
IDENTIFY-PARAMETER discourse plan force the plan
to be related to another plan that involves the parame-
ter to be identified, IDENTIFY-PARAMETER does not
explain why this information is desired; it does not cap-
ture that agents need to know parameters to be able to
perform acts involving them.11 It thus fails to model the
essential knowledge precondition nature of identifying a
parameter. Although it is possible to impose a mental
phenomenon interpretation on top of a data-structure
plan, doing so does not result in a mental phenomenon
plan [Pollack, 1990]. Saying that G1 intends to IDEN-
TIFY a PARAMETER fails to address why G1 intends
to do so.
The need to explain an utterance is not unique to in-
terpretation. Moore and Paris [1993] have shown that
a similar need exists in generation. In particular, they
have argued that RST-based text plans must be aug-
mented with intentional structure. Otherwise, a system
has no record of why it said what it did and is thus unable
to respond effectively if a hearer does not understand or
accept its utterances.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an axiomatization of
knowledge preconditions for the SharedPlan model of
collaborative activity [Grosz and Kraus, 1993]. We have
also shown how the requirements of knowledge precondi-
tions can be used to account for information-seeking sub-
dialogues in discourse. Our account of this phenomenon
fits within a general framework for discourse process-
ing in which SharedPlans and relationships among them
are used to model the intentional component of Grosz
and Sidner’s [1986] theory of discourse structure. Unlike
the alternative approaches, our approach recognizes and
makes use of discourse structure. In addition, it does
not require the introduction of new plan types.
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